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Abstract
I examine the role of intermediaries on the world’s largest peer-to-peer online lend-
ing platform. This marketplace as well as other recently opened lending websites
allow people to auction microcredit over the internet and are in line with the disin-
termediation in financial transactions through the power of enabling technologies.
On the online market, the screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of
loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. I find that, despite
superior private information, these financial intermediaries perform worse than the
average lender with respect to borrower selection. I attribute this to deliberately
sending wrong signals. Bivariate probit estimates of the effect of group membership
on loan default indicate positive self selection into group loans. That is borrowers
with worse observed and unobserved characteristics select into this contract form.
I provide evidence that this is due to a missleading group reputation system that is
driven by a short term incentive design, which was introduced by the platform to
expand the market and has been discontinued. I further find that, after controlling
for this group growth driven selection effect, group affiliation per se significantly
reduces the probability of loan default.
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1 Introduction
How much would you lend to a person you have never met before? Assume it is online
and there is no collateral to secure a defaulting loan. If your answer is something like
“maybe one Dollar” you are probably in good company.
So how can we explain the fact that there are currently $162 Millions of current
loans on one online lending platform alone? These loans are funded online, peer-to-peer,
in principle without people knowing each other and uncollateralized, meaning that the
lender has to bear the full risk in case of loan default. Furthermore lenders are not solely
seeing this as an act of charity, but as a promising investment. They create portfolio
plans and discuss their investment strategies on various online forums.
The motivations of lending online peer to peer are manifold. Besides cutting out
banks as the middlemen and thereby reducing the spread between borrower and lender
rate (Chircu and Kauffman, 2000), one major driver of the concept’s recent success is
the rapid growth of social funds and ethic banking (Heng et al., 2007). Lenders may
just feel comfortable with the idea of helping peers to realize their ideas, businesses or
passions. Studying alternatives to traditional lending is also important from the bor-
rower’s perspective. There is economic evidence that the poor in the United States have
an unmet demand for finance. Zeldes (1989) finds that poor households are borrowing
constrained. They would like to borrow more money at existing rates than they can.
Evans and Jovanovic (1989), even after controlling for possible correlation between en-
trepreneurial ability and wealth, find that a lack of wealth affects the poor’s ability to
become self-employed. Bond and Townsend (1996), who report on the results of a survey
of financial activity in a low-income neighborhood in Chicago, find that bank loans are
not an important source of finance for start-ups. Only 11.5 percent of business owners
in their sample financed their start-up with a bank loan. Furthermore, 50 percent of the
respondents financed their start-up entirely out of their own funds.
The online marketplace at hand, as one of these alternatives to traditional lending, is
an online auction website where individuals can buy loans and request to borrow money.
It is also often referred to as the eBay for loans. The lending process is managed by a
reverse dutch auction, assembling bids with the lowest interest rates in order to fund the
loan. Borrowers first write their listing and set the maximum interest rate they wish to
pay. Lenders can then bid on specific loans by committing a portion of the principal and
setting the minimum interest rate they wish to receive on a particular loan.
To reduce scam on the platform, the online market verifies selected borrowers’ identity
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before funding loans and manages loan repayment. All loans are made by WebBank, a
Utah-chartered Industrial Bank and sold to winning bidders registered as lenders. Lenders
are therefore loan purchasers. Their unsecured loans are fully amortized over three years,
with no pre-payment penalty. The company generates revenue by collecting a one-time
fee on funded loans from borrowers, and assessing an annual loan servicing fee to loan
buyers. In case of a late loan, lenders can choose a collection agency, when the loan is at
least one month late. If the collection agency can’t collect payment from the borrower
after four months of delinquency, the loan will be marked as “charge-off”, and sold to a
debt buyer. The borrower will not be able to borrow ever again from the platform, and
since the company reports delinquencies to credit reporting agencies, this charge-off will
adversely affect their credit report.
Though borrowers’ credit grades, their debt to income ratios and other variables of
their credit profiles are pulled from the credit rating agency Experian and displayed
on their listings, transactions on the electronic marketplace still occur anonymously be-
tween fictious screen names. Internet transactions of this sort entail severe information
asymmetries that cause problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. The description
borrowers provide about themselves, their projects and even their employment status and
income are mandatory information that is subject to moral hazard, because borrowers
may be inclined to overemphasize their attributes in order to get their loan funded (at a
better interest rate). The moral hazard problem is further exacerbated, since borrowers
on the electronic marketplace have no collateral to loose. They therefore do not bear
the full consequences of their actions and may act less carefully as they otherwise would.
This may lead to adverse selection as described by Akerlof (1970) and can cause credit
rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), negating the promising idea of the
platform to make loans available for subprime risks.1
To mitigate information asymmetries, the platform introduced a group system, where
the screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be dele-
gated to designated group leaders. We find that these group leaders act as intermediaries
between borrowers and lenders. This gives us a very rare opportunity to study financial
transactions with and without the use of intermediaries and compare them directly with
respect to their ability to mitigate informational asymmetries. Based on the pioneering
work of Prescott (1997) and Diamond (1984), we hypothesise that these intermediaries
contribute to reduce the prevalent credit risk in the online market. This hypothesis is put
1We find evidence for credit rationing in the market as only 40 percent of (even) the AA and A-graded
loan listings get funded and the amount of small credit volumes exceeds larger loans by far. The median
loan amount is $4,500 where the upper limit for a listing is $25,000.
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to the test with probit models of the impact of group affiliation on borrower’s repayment
performance. We also investigate the potential bias induced by selection into the group
contract and seek possible explanations for our estimates.
We find that, despite superior private information, these financial intermediaries per-
form worse than the average lender with respect to borrower selection. We attribute
this to deliberately sending wrong signals. Bivariate probit estimates of the effect of
group membership on loan default indicate positive self selection into grouploans. That
is borrowers with worse observed and unobserved characteristics select into this contract
form. We provide evidence that this is due to a missleading group reputation system
that is driven by a short term incentive design, which was introduced by the platform
to expand the market and has been discontinued in September 2007. We further find
that after controlling for this group growth driven selection effect group affiliation per se
significantly reduces the probability of loan default.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section provides an overview of the
theoretical background of financial intermediation and sets out the hypotheses. The data
and descriptive statistics are presented in the third section. In section four we present
single-equation probit estimates of loan default models. In that section we also present a
number of sensitivity tests for the single-equation model. Section five presents bivariate
probit models that treat the decision to join a group as an endogenous variable. We
discuss methodological shortcomings of our analysis in this section and present a brief
summary and conclusions in the final section of the paper.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section we review the literature on group lending, financial intermediation and
place group lending in the context of financial intermediation to derive our hypotheses.
2.1 Groups as Intermediaries
There is an emerging literature on group lending that examines the role of joint liable
group members in overcoming asymmetries of information. In a widely cited article in the
World Bank Economic Review, Stiglitz (1990) argues that a group lending contract, where
borrowers from the same group are jointly responsible for each others’ performance, can
circumvent ex-ante moral hazard by inducing borrowers to monitor each others’ choice
of projects and to inflict penalties upon borrowers who have chosen excessively risky
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projects. Varian (1990) examines the important screening role groups may provide. That
is, their use of prior knowledge about others to form groups, that can be harnessed to
mitigate adverse selection. Besley and Coate (1995) examine the potential enforcement
advantages groups may have. For example, social ostracism of defaulters is an option
available to groups but not to outsiders. While groupmembers are not joint liable on
the electronic marketplace, the group leader’s financial rewards crucially depend on the
repayment performance of his groupmembers. When studying two group lending pro-
grams in Eritrea, Hermes et al. (2005) find that peer monitoring by and social ties of
the group leader may help to reduce moral hazard behaviour of group members, whereas
they find no such link for other group members. Though their study is the first of this
kind, it supports the assertion that some virtues of group lending are transferable to the
electronic marketplace as well.
While we acknowledge that some of these features of group lending may play a role
in the online marketplace’s online group concept and control for them in our models, we
abstract from them in the following discussion and follow the interpretation of groups as
financial intermediaries (Prescott, 1997).
Groups on the electronic marketplace can be seen as intermediaries, because they act
as delegated monitors. Diamond (1984) argues in a seminal paper that if monitoring is
costly and lenders in a syndicate want to monitor a borrower, monitoring expenditures
will either be inefficiently high, or lenders will have an incentive to free ride on the
monitoring efforts of others and consequently no lender has an incentive to monitor. In
this situation, an intermediary as a delegated monitor minimizes the costs of monitoring.
This argumentation is applicable to the online lending mechanism, because the capital
of several lenders is syndicated into one loan and lenders face a large number of credit
listings on the marketplace. Acquiring private information about credit listings, that
allows lenders to better assess credit risk, requires time and is cost intensive. Group
leaders can therefore realize significant economies of scale in producing information for
the marketplace by acting as intermediaries and producing additional private information
about credit listings within groups.
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) show that intermediaries can solve another informa-
tion problem prevalent on online marketplaces. When borrowers might be hesitant to
disclose private information to a large number of lenders in a public financial market, an
intermediary can act as facilitator of knowledge sharing whereby proprietary information
is only disclosed to the intermediary. Groups therefore enable a better assessment of
borrowers’ credit quality by producing additional private information. We deduce:
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Hypothesis 1: Group membership reduces default rates, because lenders are better able to
discriminate risky from save types in the market for group loans than in the market for
individual loans.
2.2 Financial Intermediation and Signaling
The reliability of information produced by an intermediary is a prevalent problem in the
intermediation literature. Group leaders might recommend credit listings within their
group without prior diligent screening. It may be difficult or impossible for potential
lenders to distinguish good information from bad. This can lead to market failure in
the platform, because entry is easy for groups offering poor information. With imperfect
information on borrowers’ credit quality, lenders can use publicly observable signals to
assess credit risk as shown in the seminal works of Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973) and
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
On Proser Marketplace, group leaders can signal the credibility of their group’s list-
ings by placing a bid on it. Leland and Pyle (1977) show that the investment of the
intermediary is an observable signal for information quality. However we know from auc-
tion theory that individual investment decisions on financial markets can be subject to
herding behaviour. Individual decisions may not be based on adequate information but
the behaviour of other market participants (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). Anecdotal
evidence from the platform shows, that group leaders made use of this effect to place a
first bid with an exorbitant maximum rate to get the auction started, being aware of the
fact that they will be bidded out of the auction as it proceeds. As we are only interested
in the group leader’s investment, as his fraction of the loan amount when the loan got
funded, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A group leader’s participating bid on a borrowers listing serves as a credible
signal for information quality. The higher the fraction of the loan amount collaterized by
the group leader, the less likely is a loan to default.
2.3 Financial Intermediation and Reputation
A second way for group leaders to credibly signal information quality is to build up a
reputation for timely loan repayment. On October 18th, 2006, the electronic marketplace
introduced a star rating (1 to 5 stars) as a formal reputation system to make groups’ past
conduct more transparent. The group rating is a measurement of a group’s performance
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in paying back its loans in comparison to expected historical Experian default rates. So
for a successful repayment of a high risk loan with credit grade HR, the group will build
up more reputation than for the repayment of a prime risk, AA rated loan. The rating is
calculated for groups that have at least 15 payments billed (had at least fifteen monthly
loan repayments; be it by one borrower or more). The more billed payments are displayed
with the star rating, the more stable a rating system should be.
The concept of reputation has brought forward a large body of literature. From a
game theoretic perspective, a history of cooperation does not imply that there will be
cooperation (or even greater cooperation) in the future (Sobel, 2002, p. 150). But Watson
(1999) and Sobel (2006) build models of the formation of trust by allowing agents to
build reputation through informative past transactions. The reputation built by shared
information about past conduct is part of the information contained in a traditional
credit rating. The role of information tacking systems like credit bureaus in following the
behaviour of borrowers modelled by Klein (1992) is well acknowledged (MacLeod, 2007).
Tirole (1996) also shows theoretically how a group’s good reputation positively influences
individual behaviour. This leads us to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: A borrower in an overperforming group is less likely to default on his loan.
Further, a group rating that is more stable in the sense of a higher number of billed loans,
reduces default risk.
2.4 The Potential of Sorting Behaviour
Given that lenders can discriminate between good and bad information with the help of
the group reputation system, the same must hold for potential borrowers, because each
group’s star rating is publicly available. An overperforming group rating will now lead to
a higher number of applicants to that group, seeking a group that promotes their listing
with a high reputation.2 The group leader can in turn be more selective in the application
and pre-screening process and further improve the group’s reputation by selecting better
borrowers. This results in a virtuous circle that leads to assortative matching (Becker,
1973) between groups and applying borrowers.3 This potential assortative matching leads
to the following hypothesis:
2The pioneering study of Berger and Gleisner (2008) finds that an overperforming star rating signifi-
cantly reduces borrowers’ interest rates.
3Assortative matching is a concept used in group lending to overcome adverse selection through joint
liable group members and local information (Ghatak, 1999).
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Hypothesis 4: Borrowers with better observed and unobserved characteristics select into
groups. There is negative selection into group contracts.
2.5 The Vitality of Incentives
By formulating these hypotheses, we must not forget that intermediation just shifts the
cooperation problem between borrower and lender to a cooperation problem between
intermediary and lender. Dependent on the incentive scheme, a group leader may still
find it optimal to send misleading signals if their costs are below the possible short-
term gain of cheating. During the period of our sample, the company had implemented
a monetary incentive scheme for group leaders. The incentive scheme meets the two
functions of a group leader.
First, group leaders are supposed to filter applying borrowers for credibility and are
therefore rewarded a payment reward upon successful loan repayment. The payment
reward is dependent on the borrower’s credit grade. For AA to HR rated borrowers, 1
to 4 percent of the loan’s monthly payment rate is awarded to the group leader upon
borrower’s timely repayment.4 To ensure that the loan is not bad, the first three months’
payment rewards are held back and paid to the group leader when the loan is paid in full.
Should the loan default in the first three months, the accumulated repayment rewards of
this loan are used to satisfy the creditors. We refer to the payment reward as the group
leader’s long term incentives to select credible borrowers based on local information and
diligent screening.
Second, a match reward was introduced by the platform primarily to expand the
market, using group leaders as marketeers. This reward might have set the right signals
for group leaders to recruit new borrowers and help them get their listing funded, as
can be seen in the historical growth of the number of group loans between February
2006 and September 2007 in Figure 1. But it created perverse incentives to get new
borrowers funded without thoroughly screening them. Some groups had over 100 funded
loans per month (see Figure 2 for the largest group). And this is without mentioning the
unsuccessful listings and members joining these groups at this time.
Group leaders were then free to choose a fraction of the group leader reward they want to
share with the borrower. This can be either 100 percent, i.e. the rewards are fully shared
with the borrower or any fourth down to 0 percent, where the group leader receives the
full rewards. The direction of action of this incentive scheme is not clear in advance,
4For extent and variation of the financial rewards please refer to Figure 3.
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Figure 1: The Platform’s Loan History
Figure 2: Largest Borrowers’ Group Evolution
Data 10
Figure 3: The Company’s Reward Changes
but the design of these incentives seems to play a crucial role in determining the group
leader’s actions. We will get a clearer picture of the impact of the reward system in the
empirics part in Section 5.
3 Data
The data used for this analysis comes from the platform’s public and private data ex-
ports. As most of the variables in the snapshot of the platform are observed only at
the observation date, and we are interested in the variables the day a loan got listed or
funded, we used PERL based programs to pull historical variables from the site. We
further replicated the group rating the day a listing is placed and the group leader re-
ward rate of the group with the help of the formulas provided by the company on their
homepage. The final sample consists of 10,217 loans, funded at the platform from the in-
troduction of the group rating system on October 19th, 2006 until September 12th, 2007,
when the group leader reward system was discontinued. We restrict the sample to this
time horizon, because there were no notable policy changes on the platform that might
bias our estimates (see Figure 4). We restrict the sample to those loans which have not
been cancelled or repurchased by the company due to credit card or identity theft. We
then consider only the loan performance in the 11th month loan cycle5 and dichotomize
the loan status into the categories “default” and “non default”, where we consider a 4+
month late loan as “default” because we find that almost all of these loans defaulted in
5We do not use the loan performance at this point in time as given in the data export and control with
the loans’ age in months because it implies a paradox situation for defaulted loans. We want to estimate
a model for loan default, when the loan got funded, so we can not feed our model with information that
is available only thereafter. If a loan defaults in the 3rd loan cycle, we would set his loan age to 3 for
all times. That is, we would use information about a loan’s status to predict this status. We further do
not use survival analysis, because the time to death (here: default) is restricted to the length of the loan
term of 36 months in every case.
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the past. Though this approach means ignoring valuable information, we find this is the
best way to proceed. We check for robustness, using alternative measures of default in
Section 5.5. Means and standard deviations of the independent variables are shown in
Table 1, these variables can be categorized along the following four dimensions.
Figure 4: The Platform’s Policy Regimes
3.1 Credit Profile
The most powerful variables to discriminate between defaulting and non defaulting bor-
rowers are those from their individual credit profiles. The CreditGrade assigned to every
borrower by the US based credit rating agency Experian ranges in 7 categories from
AA to HR (high risk). The DebtToIncomeRatio is censored from above at 1000 percent
which is only relevant for 225 loans and not displayed for 304 self-employed borrowers and
528 other loans. The variable IsBorrowerHomeowner is not available for 590 loans. The
categorical variables EmploymentStatus and Income are self reported by the borrower
at the time the listing is created. Further variables are the history of the borrower’s
delinquencies, inquiries and total credit lines and the length of his employment status.
• CreditGrade
• DebtToIncomeRatio
• IsBorrowerHomeowner
• EmploymentStatus
• Income
• DelinquenciesLast7Y
• InquiriesLast6Months
• TotalCreditLines
• LenghtStatusMonths
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A broader Credit Profiles Object is available from the private data export but this in-
formation is only available for loans created from March 2007 on, which makes this data
inadequate for our purposes.
3.2 Loanspecific Variables
Loanspecific variables that determine loan default are the AmountBorrowed and Fundin-
gOption. The latter is a binary variable that is 0 if the listing is open for the auction’s
full duration of 10 days and 1 if the listing closes as soon as it is funded 100 percent.
• AmountBorrowed • FundingOption
3.3 Social Collateral and Self-Disclosure
The uniqueness of this dataset is that we have information about a number of social
capital measures. One feature is the Endorsement function where every active member
on the platform is allowed to write an Endorsement for a borrower’s listing to make it
more appealing to creditors. StateDiffGL is a binary that indicates if group leader and
borrower live in the same state and puts the irrelevance of distance hypotheses of online
markets to the test. BorrowerCity is an optional field on the borrower’s listing that
displays his city of residence as shown on his identity card. This variable allows us to
control for the effect of self-disclosure on loan default.
The variables GLCol and GroupCol are the fractions of the AmountBorrowed that
are financed, i.e. collaterized, by group leaders and group members respectively. These
variables show if lending from groupmembers makes a difference with respect to repay-
ment performance. PartAm/AmBorr gives us the ratio of a borrower’s “deposits” and
credits on the platform. Some groups have rigorous rules of conduct that oblige a bor-
rower to become an active lender on the platform before applying for groupmembership
or to reinvest a fraction of their LoanAmount. Evidence from credit cooperatives shows
that borrower’s deposits function as collateral and reduce default risk (Banerjee et al.,
1994).
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• Endorsement
• StateDiffGL
• BorrowerCity
• GLCol
• GroupCol
• PartAm/AmBorr
3.4 Group Characteristics
A group’s capability to screen applying borrowers is essential for the model of financial
intermediation to hold. A variable that allows insights into the quality of the screening
process is GroupGrowth at the time the loan was funded, which is a measure of the
number of loans that where funded in this group the month before the loan got funded.
The group rating is a 1 to 5 star based group rating, visible to every lender at the
time the listing was created. GroupRatingBin is just a binary indicating if the group has
over- or underperformed the benchmark given by the Experian historical default rate.
The number of billed payments (NoBilled) indicates the stability of the group rating.
By building up reputation in the form of a high group rating, a group leader was able
to make some money by charging fees, “group leader rewards”, until the group reward
system was discontinued on September 12th, 2007. The GLRewardPercentage is the
portion of the borrower rate (sum of match and payment reward) that is paid to the
group leader. Setting a higher GLRewardPercentage allows the group leader to capitalize
on his efforts in building reputation, or leads group leaders to sell out their reputation.
Since the reputation system was discontinued in September 2007, which was effectively
setting the GroupLeaderReward to zero, only 33 active groups have been founded –
compared to 707 in the same time period before. Not surprisingly, the fraction of groups
that no longer accepts new borrowers makes up 39 percent of the groups that ever had a
loan.
• GroupGrowth
• GLRewardPercentage
• GroupRatingBin
• NoBilled
In the next section we will set up probit models of loan default, to test our hypothesis
that group members have a better record of loan performance than individual borrowers.
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations
Sample Group Loans Individual Loans
mean sd mean sd mean sd
GroupAffiliation 0.62 0.48 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
StatusBin 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.31
RateCap 0.24 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.24 0.09
FracGroupLoansInState 0.62 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.62 0.04
CreditGrade AA 0.10 0.31 0.09 0.26 0.15 0.36
CreditGrade A 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.33
CreditGrade B 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36
CreditGrade C 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39
CreditGrade D 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38
CreditGrade E 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.32
CreditGrade HR 0.17 0.37 0.22 0.41 0.09 0.28
CreditGrade NC 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05
DebtToIncomeRatio 0.44 1.37 0.50 1.50 0.35 1.11
DelinquenciesLast7Years 7.11 13.38 8.02 14.24 5.60 11.67
InquiriesLast6Months 3.49 4.53 3.77 4.84 3.03 3.93
TotalCreditLines 23.97 13.99 24.22 13.90 23.57 14.14
IsBorrowerHomeowner True 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.46 0.50
LengthStatusMonths 39.56 65.68 36.97 64.37 43.88 67.59
AmountBorrowed 6531.45 5849.49 6469.63 5730.36 6634.17 6041.58
EmploymentStatus Full-time 0.60 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.65 0.48
EmploymentStatus Not available 0.35 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.30 0.46
EmploymentStatus Not employed 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
EmploymentStatus Part-time 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17
EmploymentStatus Retired 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11
EmploymentStatus Self-employed 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21
Income NotDisplayed 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.32 0.47
Income NotEmployed 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.06
Income $1-24k 0.10 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28
Income $25-49k 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
Income $50-74k 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38
Income $75-99k 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28
Income $100k+ 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.27
LenderRate 0.18 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.17 0.07
BorrowerRate 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.17 0.07
FundingOption Open For Duration 0.69 0.46 0.75 0.43 0.58 0.49
Endorsements 0.40 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.21 0.41
BorrowerCity 0.32 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.20 0.40
PartAm/AmBorr 0.02 0.73 0.00 0.05 0.04 1.19
GroupCol – – 0.01 0.05 – –
GLCol – – 0.04 0.13 – –
StateDiffGLSame – – 0.12 0.33 – –
GLRewardPercentageOfBase – – 0.28 0.27 – –
GroupGrowth – – 33.18 38.89 – –
GroupRatingBin Underperforming – – 0.14 0.35 – –
GroupRatingBin Overperforming – – 0.58 0.49 – –
NoBilled – – 243.61 476.77 – –
IsAcceptingNewMembersFalse – – 0.45 0.50 – –
Observations 10,217 6,378 3,839
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4 Probit Models of Loan Performance
4.1 Single-Equation Probit Models
We set up the following model to estimate the probability of a given loan to default. Let
the indicator variable Yi = 1 if borrower i defaulted on his loan, and let Yi = 0 otherwise.
The model is described by the latent variable model
Y ∗i = Xiβ +Giδ + ui, (1)
where Y ∗i is a latent variable that indicates a score value of loan default, Xi is a vector
of individual characteristics, Gi is the group affiliation dummy, and ui is a normally
distributed random error with zero mean and unit variance. Borrowers only default on
their loan, if their score of loan default exceeds a threshold c,{
Yi = 1 if Y
∗
i > c
Yi = 0 if Y
∗
i ≤ c
and thus the probability that a loan defaults is
P (Yi = 1) = P (Xiβ +Giδ + ui > c) = Φ(Xiβ +Giδ),
where Φ is the evaluation of the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
For the first single equation probit model, we consider all variables from the borrower’s
credit profile, but leave out those variables that are subject to the borrowers’ contract
choice – except the binary of interest: GroupAffilition. That is, we omit all group char-
acteristics, because they may be endogenous, since they are subject to the borrower’s
choice. The probit estimates in Table 3 show that, after controlling for other variables in
the credit profile, GroupAffilition has no significant impact on the loan status.
The other results in Table 3 are consistent with the literature in this field (Avery
et al., 1996). One exception is the binary IsBorrowerHomeowner, that we would have
expected to have a negative impact on loan default. One reasonable explanation for our
estimate are the antecedents of the subprime mortgage crisis which became apparent
throughout the period of our sample in 2007. Homeowners who were not able to serve
their bank loans may have chosen the electronic marketplace to reschedule their debts.
Thus the credit quality of homeowners might have been considerably worse than that of
other borrowers on the online market.
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Table 3: Probit of Loan Default
Single Equation Probit
Probit Probit (robust)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) -2.5530 (0.1300)*** -2.1420 (0.1423)***
GroupAffiliation -0.0442 (0.0370) 0.0716 (0.0414).
CreditGrade A 0.3293 (0.1257)** 0.2298 (0.1345).
CreditGrade B 0.5924 (0.1147)*** 0.4537 (0.1233)***
CreditGrade C 0.9297 (0.1092)*** 0.7448 (0.1184)***
CreditGrade D 1.0770 (0.1108)*** 0.8837 (0.1204)***
CreditGrade E 1.4090 (0.1146)*** 1.1990 (0.1248)***
CreditGrade HR 1.8130 (0.1151)*** 1.5910 (0.1258)***
CreditGrade NC 2.2060 (0.2364)*** 1.9050 (0.2426)***
DebtToIncomeRatio 0.0218 (0.0127). 0.0238 (0.0130).
DelinquenciesLast7Years 0.0028 (0.0012)* 0.0021 (0.0012).
InquiriesLast6Months 0.0296 (0.0035)*** 0.0295 (0.0035)***
TotalCreditLines -0.0005 (0.0014) -0.0010 (0.0014)
IsBorrowerHomeowner True 0.0716 (0.0401). 0.0833 (0.0408)*
LengthStatusMonths -0.0005 (0.0003) -0.0007 (0.0003)*
AmountBorrowed 0.0000 (0.0000)*** 0.0000 (0.0000)***
Income NotDisplayed -0.1599 (0.1815) -0.1968 (0.1864)
Income NotEmployed -0.0065 (0.4803) 0.0702 (0.4858)
Income $25-49k -0.0304 (0.0732) -0.0178 (0.0739)
Income $50-74k -0.1222 (0.0814) -0.0949 (0.0824)
Income $75-99k -0.2110 (0.1009)* -0.1707 (0.1028).
Income $100k+ -0.0742 (0.1041) -0.0369 (0.1069)
EmploymentStatus Not available 0.1028 (0.1770) 0.0923 (0.1825)
EmploymentStatus Not employed 0.2516 (0.4248) 0.1194 (0.4298)
EmploymentStatus Part-time -0.0900 (0.1297) -0.1151 (0.1315)
EmploymentStatus Retired -0.0303 (0.1739) -0.0178 (0.1763)
EmploymentStatus Self-employed 0.2373 (0.0812)** 0.2333 (0.0828)**
FundingOption OpenForDuration -0.2099 (0.0375)***
Endorsements -0.1244 (0.0394)**
BorrowerCity -0.0691 (0.0380).
PartAm/AmBorr -0.8875 (0.0857)***
Observations 10,217 10,217
AIC 7,028 6,820
Notes: Signif. codes: 0 ′***′ 0.001 ′**′ 0.01 ′*′ 0.05 ′.′ 0.1 ′ ′ 1
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4.2 Potential Omitted Variable Bias
In this section we test for robustness of the results. Our primary concern here is that
we may have omitted important (measurable) characteristics of the borrower that are
correlated with the group dummy and that, as a consequence, we have understated the
benefits of group affiliation. The data export provides us with some more variables that
we were hesitant to include in the model, not because they are subject to the borrower’s
decision to join a group or to list individual, but because they are conditional on this
decision.
A group leader’s primary job is to help the borrower to get his listing funded. The
borrower’s choice of the FundingOption, his choice to disclose his city of residence (Bor-
rowerCity) and the endorsements on his listing are determined after his decision to list
with a group and may therefore be influenced by the group leader. When introducing
these variables into our model, the estimate for the GroupAffiliation dummy becomes
positive (see Table 3). The significance of this change in sign is not surprising, given
that all three variables are positively correlated with the group dummy and have a neg-
ative impact on loan default. Choosing to leave the listing open for the full duration of
the auction signals a borrower’s interest in a lower interest rate (Klemperer, 2004) and
therefore in repaying the loan. Sharing his city of residence works as self-disclosure and
therefore reduces uncertainty in the electronic marketplace (Tidwell and Walther, 2002).
Group leaders, who have a better grasp of the market than rookie borrowers seem to
advise their members to keep their hands off the quick funding option and display as
many details as possible to get their loans funded (see Table 1). Further, either group
leaders or group members seem to endorse borrowers in their own group, because group
loans exhibit twice the number of endorsements that individual loans do.
4.3 Group Selectivity or Self-Selection?
We now turn our attention to the concern that we have omitted important unobserv-
able characteristics of the borrower that are correlated with the group dummy. On the
electronic marketplace, a borrower first has to apply for group membership and to be
accepted by the group leader to start his listing with a certain group. Group leaders
are therefore free to select their members with respect to credibility, amongst others.
Thus, part of the GroupAffiliation effect could be due to the way group leaders choose
their members. As we do not observe the selection process but only the result, we can
expect our estimates to be biased because of unobserved omitted variables that drive the
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selection into groups if they also impact loan default (i.e. if group leaders are successfully
selecting their members with respect to credibility as derived in Hypothesis 4 ).
To see the argument from the opposite angle, consider a start-up that seeks access
to finance on the online lending market, for reasons addressed in the Introduction of
this paper. One considerable problem of this entrepreneur is that he did not yet have
the opportunity to build up reputation in the form of an excellent credit rating. Breuer
(1995) claims that for young firms, reputation building often does not pay because of
their low probability of continuation. He suggests that start-ups are therefore more likely
to make use of the services of an intermediary to avoid immanent incentive problems.
The same reasoning may hold for private borrowers who – just as the entrepreneur – have
an irregular income or a missing credit history. They will be more likely to self-select
into groups. However they are only group loans in our sample if the groupleader accepted
them.
From these two examples it is obvious that the selection process is not an unilateral,
but instead a bilateral matching process that takes place in a sequential way. Membership
in a particular group always requires the borrower’s application as well as the group
leader’s acceptance. We will abstract from this complexity for the rest of this discussion
and interpret the selection process very cautiously, though we acknowledge that there
would be more appropriate methods to handle the properties of our data.6
Following this perception, a probit model is a very simplified selection equation. For
the moment we even go one step below. We run a simple OLS to estimate the proba-
bility of selecting into a group. We need this model to test GroupAffiliation for endo-
geneity using a test proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988). This test may save us the
tricky interpretation of the selection effects if it does not allow us to reject the null that
GroupAffiliation is exogenous.
The logic of this test is very much like a standard Hausman test for endogeneity but
with a structural equation that is a probit instead of an OLS. The idea is to compare the
standard probit with a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) probit. If Gi is uncorrelated
with ui, the probit and the IV probit should differ only by sampling error. The model
6Sørensen (2007) proposes a model based on the two stage Heckman selection model, where the
selection equation controls for sorting and is based on a two-sided matching model known as the college
admissions model (see Gale and Shapley, 1962). Besides the computational complexity of this model, that
necessitates considerable compromises in model specification, the problem of a dichotomous dependent
variable in the structural equation has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been addressed.
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we set up is:
Gi = Xiγ + IViη + vi (2)
P (Yi = 1) = P (Xiβ +Giδ + viα + ui > c), (3)
where Equation (2) is an OLS with instrumental variables (IV) and the structural model
in Equation (3) is our well known probit model of loan default with the residuals of
the selection equation vi as an extra regressor. The t-test of α is then a valid test for
exogeneity of Gi (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 474).
7
Instruments
To run the IV probit, we need at least one IV that must be correlated with Gi but must
not be correlated with Yi. Two possible candidates are:
• RateCap • FracGroupLoansInState.
RateCap contains the maximum interest rate that can be charged for private loans in the
borrower’s state (state interest rate cap). This limit is defined in the state level usury
law, but companies like the electronic marketplace have their own state specific rules.
There has been one major change in the interest rate limits, when the platform went
from interest rates to annual percentage rate (APR) caps in May 2007.8 We replicated
all the historical RateCap changes on the platform for the full time period of the sample.
The variation of RateCaps, following a strict schedule across states, time and loan
categories that we can control for, makes RateCaps a perfect instrument for the selection
process into group or individual loans. The rationale behind it is that borrowers living
in a state with a low rate cap should have a higher propensity to join a group, because
groupmembership significantly reduces interest rates ceteris paribus as shown in studies
by Freedman and Jin (2008) and Berger and Gleisner (2008). Imagine a high risk borrower
from Texas, where the interest rate cap is 10 percent for private loans and 18 percent
for business loans. To get his loan funded, he has to convince potential lenders that
he is worth a lower risk premium. One way to do this is to capitalize on a group’s
7Though Rivers and Vuong (1988) proposed this procedure to test for endogeneity in a probit model
with possibly endogenous continuous explanatory variables, this test can also be applied to binary
variables because under the null hypothesis that Gi is exogenous, the distribution of the first stage
equation plays no role (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 474).
8By affiliating with Web Bank on April 15th, 2008, borrowers nationwide (except in Texas and South
Dakota) can offer a maximum interest rate of 36 percent which lenders can then bid down.
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reputation. The group system therefore is a way to overcome credit rationing induced by
low RateCaps.
While the selection process significantly depends on the RateCap faced by the bor-
rower, the loan performance is independent of this covariate after controlling for loanspe-
cific variables and the borrower’s credit profile. The same holds for the fraction of grou-
ploans in the borrower’s state (FracGroupLoansInState). This covariate controls for
other statespecific characteristics (see Figure 5 for the dispersion of this measure across
the fifty US states). While RateCap also captures time effects of the decision to join a
group, FracGroupLoansInState solely captures geographical and state specific aspects.
Figure 5: Fraction of Group Loans Across US States
Running the IV probit with these two instruments yields a slightly significant t-value
(1.75) for α.9 Though the exact value of the t-statistic is not meaningful if Gi and ui are
correlated, because apart from the null, normality of vi is crucial, it gives reasoning to
track the endogeneity problem with more appropriate methods in the next section.
5 Bivariate Probit Models
5.1 Why not a Matching Method?
The best evidence for loan performance of individual loans versus group loans would
come from well-designed, deliberate experiments in which loan contracts are varied but
everything else is kept the same. This can be achieved in a lab setting (see Abbink et al.,
9We will address the validity of our instruments in the next section.
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2006) but is very difficult to conduct in the field. Karlan (2007) makes use of a quasi-
random group formation process by the microfinance institute FINCA in Peru, where
applicants sign up in a list and every 30 names the list is closed and a group is formed.
Gomez and Santor (2003) control for borrowers’ self selection into group loans with
the help of matching methods when estimating the treatment effect of group affiliation in
Calmeadow’s microfinance program in Canada. Instead of matching pairs of borrowers
along conditional variables, they are matched along a propensity score – the probability
that the borrower selected into the treatment (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The
limitation of utilizing the propensity score as a measure of comparability is determined
by the availability of sufficient conditioning variables. If the process of selection into
the participation and non-participation states is a function of unobservables that are not
captured by the observable data, then the control group may not be properly specified
(Smith and Todd, 2001). This method is hence not applicable in our case for two main
reasons. First, although our data set has rich information about social capital measures
and group characteristics, we do not observe any demographic variables of our borrowers,
except the information contained in Experian’s credit profile. This will lead to a poor
measurement of the decision to participate in the program, the treatment and control
groups will be poorly matched, and any inferences on the effect of the treatment on the
treated will be biased in an undetermined manner. Second, we do not use matching meth-
ods because of their limitation on observable characteristics. If we want to test the model
of intermediation, we must, by definition, expect group leaders to screen and select their
group members based on local information which is not observed on the platform. If se-
lection was solely dependent on observables, the role of financial intermediaries screening
borrowers ex ante would be invalid.
5.2 The Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection
Resorting to the literature on treatment effects when the outcome of interest is binary, we
make use of a recursive bivariate probit model. Using this method allows us to control for
ex ante screening and selection into the group (Hypothesis 4 ) and to separate the single
effect of being in a group on loan performance (Hypothesis 1 ).10
The bivariate probit with endogenous dummy model belongs to the general class of
simultaneous equation models with both continuous and discrete endogenous variables
10The interpretation is the same as with a Heckman two-stage correction, but using the latter method
may produce inconsistent estimates because our structural equation is not linear (Wooldridge, 2002, p.
478).
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introduced by Heckman (1978). The recursive structure builds on a first reduced form
equation for the potentially endogenous dummy GroupAffiliation (Gi) and a second struc-
tural form equation determining loan default:
G∗i = Ziγ + vi (4)
Y ∗i = Xiβ +Giδ + ui, (5)
where G∗i and Y
∗
i are latents, Gi and Yi are dycotomous variables observed and Gi is
following the rule {
Gi = 1 if G
∗
i > 0
Gi = 0 if G
∗
i ≤ 0,
that is a borrower selects into a group if his expected net benefit of joining a group is
positive. The error terms are assumed to be independently and identical distributed as
bivariate normal: (
ui
vi
)
∼ i.i.d.N
([
0
0
]
,
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
])
.
A widespread opinion in the literature is that the parameters of the structural equation
are not identified unless Zi includes at least one variable not contained in Xi (as in linear
simultaneous equations for fully observed endogenous variables). This assertion stated
by Maddala (1983) has been contested by Wilde (2000), who shows that exlusion restric-
tions are not needed provided there is one varying exogenous regressor in each equation.
Therefore Zi and Xi are not necessarily distinct design matrices. The parameter vector
(β, γ, ρ) can be estimated by maximum likelihood. The sample likelihood function, that
has to be maximized resorting to numerical methods is given by
ln L(β, γ, ρ) =
n∑
i=1
d11lnP
11
i + d10lnP
10
i + d01lnP
01
i + d00lnP
00
i ,
where
d11 = GiYi; d10 = Gi(1− Yi); d01 = (1−Gi)Yi; d00 = (1−Gi)(1− Yi)
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and
P 11i = P (Gi = 1, Yi = 1|Zi, Xi) = Φ2(Ziγ,Xiβ + δi, ρ)
P 10i = Φ2(Ziγ,−Xiβ − δi,−ρ)
P 01i = Φ2(−Ziγ,Xiβ,−ρ)
P 00i = Φ2(−Ziγ,−Xiβ, ρ)
and Φ2(·, ·, ρ) is the bivariate normal distribution function of the model error terms. To
make this notation clearer, let us consider the first of four possible states of the world
Gi = 0 or 1, and Yi = 0 or 1, as notated above.
The likelihood to observe a borrower i who is group member (Gi = 1) and defaults
on his loan (Yi = 1) is given by P
11
i . The dummy d11 takes the value 1 only if Gi = 1 and
Yi = 1, because for this borrower we only observe this one and only state of the world.
Consequently, the three other dummies are 0. P 11i is just the chance that our borrower
selects into a group (vi > −Ziγ) and defaults on his loan (ui > −Xiβ − δ) as modelled
in Equations (4) and (5) respectively.
Let us have a look at the correlation parameter ρ between the error terms of Equations
(4) and (5). If we find that ρ = 0, then Gi is independent of ui and the single-equation
probit model we estimated in Section 4 is an appropriate approach to model our observa-
tions. If ρ 6= 0, then Gi is dependent on ui, because ui is correlated with vi, and vi comes
into Equation (4) that determines Gi. In the following discussion, we interpret a positive
correlation of the error terms as a positive self-selection of borrowers into groups. That
is, borrowers with worse unobservable characteristics select into this contract form. The
reasoning behind this interpretation is that unobservable characteristics of the borrower
that make him select into a group, are captured by the error term vi and positively cor-
related with the error term ui. That is, if we omit these variables that have a positive
effect on loan default (make a borrower more likely to default) in the structural equation,
our estimates would be biased upwards. Correcting for this bias with an simultaneous
estimation of the two equations therefore generates consistent estimates.
5.3 Results
We first estimate the bivariate probit without instruments, making use of the Wilde (2000)
findings and then evaluate the same model using RateCap and FracGroupLoansInState
as instrumental variables.
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The bivariate probit without instruments in Table 6 shows a highly significant negative
effect of GroupAffiliation on loan default and when evaluating the correlation of the error
terms we find that ρ is considerably larger than null (0.29). The ρ estimate signifies a
selection of borrowers with worse characteristics into group contracts. This finding, which
is consistent with the positive coefficient of vi in the Rivers and Vuong (1988) test, would
mean that we have to reject our Hypothesis 4.
Running the same bivariate probit with instruments does not have much impact on our
results. As expected, the two instruments do an excelent job in explaining the selection
process (see Table 5), but the coefficient of GroupAffiliation is still highly significant and
a ρ of 0.18 is still distinct different from null. Even the robustness check with the three
possibly endogenous variables FundingOption, BorrowerCity and Endorsements that lead
to an upwards shift in the coefficient of GroupAffiliation in the single-equation probit does
not change the results in this case (see Table 4).
Table 4: Bivariate Probit of Loan Default – Robustness Check
Selection Equation
without Instruments with Instruments
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
RateCap -0.4520 (0.1476)**
FracGroupLoansInState 2.3653 (0.2942)***
Controls YES YES
Outcome Equation
without Instruments with Instruments
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
GroupAffiliation -0.5754 (0.0390)*** -0.1617 (0.0407)***
Controls YES YES
FundingOptionOpen For Duration -0.2051 (0.0357)*** -0.2106 (0.0371)***
BorrowerCity -0.0666 (0.0375)* -0.0683 (0.0381)*
Endorsements -0.1183 (0.0386)** -0.1234 (0.0394)***
PartAm/AmBorr -0.8549 (0.0767)*** -0.8854 (0.0844)***
Observations 10,217 10,217
ATE GroupAffiliation -0.0789 (0.0815) -0.0203 (0.0216)
ρ 0.3743 0.1092
Notes: Signif. codes: 0 ′***′ 0.001 ′**′ 0.01 ′*′ 0.05 ′.′ 0.1 ′ ′ 1
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Table 5: Bivariate Probit of Loan Default – Selection Equation
Selection Equation
without Instruments with Instruments
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept):1 -0.4065 (0.0698)*** -1.7732 (0.1932)***
RateCap -0.4491 (-0.1473)**
FracGroupLoansInState 2.3762 (0.2938)***
CreditGrade A 0.0765 (0.0565). 0.0729 (0.0567).
CreditGrade B 0.1650 (0.0534)** 0.1645 (0.0536)**
CreditGrade C 0.3569 (0.0507)*** 0.3576 (0.0509)***
CreditGrade D 0.4655 (0.0522)*** 0.4634 (0.0524)***
CreditGrade E 0.5756 (0.0581)*** 0.5725 (0.0583)***
CreditGrade HR 1.0204 (0.0595)*** 1.0085 (0.0597)***
CreditGrade NC 1.0260 (0.2352)*** 0.9948 (0.2351)***
DebtToIncomeRatio 0.0503 (0.0113)*** 0.0496 (0.0113)***
DelinquenciesLast7Years 0.0022 (0.0011)* 0.0022 (0.0011)*
InquiriesLast6Months 0.0047 (0.0032). 0.0053 (0.0032).
TotalCreditLines 0.0053 (0.0011)*** 0.0051 (0.0011)***
IsBorrowerHomeowner True -0.0409 (0.0304). -0.0401 (0.0305).
LengthStatusMonths -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002)
AmountBorrowed 0.0000 (0.0000)*** 0.0000 (0.0000)***
Income NotDisplayed -0.2234 (0.1185)* -0.2160 (0.1189)*
Income NotEmployed 0.5895 (0.3676). 0.5441 (0.3704).
Income $25-49k 0.0315 (0.0563) 0.0410 (0.0564)
Income $50-74k -0.0492 (0.0616) -0.0479 (0.0617)
Income $75-99k -0.1079 (0.0722). -0.0962 (0.0724).
Income $100k+ -0.2596 (0.0763)*** -0.2573 (0.0765)***
EmploymentStatus Not available 0.3209 (0.1138)** 0.2889 (0.1143)**
EmploymentStatus Not employed -0.2534 (0.3068) -0.2310 (0.3097)
EmploymentStatus Part-time -0.0527 (0.0883) -0.0493 (0.0885)
EmploymentStatus Retired 0.1057 (0.1187) 0.1160 (0.1191)
EmploymentStatus Self-employed 0.1358 (0.0642)* 0.1304 (0.0644)*
Notes: Signif. codes: 0 ′***′ 0.001 ′**′ 0.01 ′*′ 0.05 ′.′ 0.1 ′ ′ 1
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Table 6: Bivariate Probit of Loan Default – Outcome Equation
Outcome Equation
without Instruments with Instruments
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept):2 -2.3010 (0.1212)*** -2.4099 (0.1260)***
(Intercept):3 0.6130 (0.0473)*** 0.3715 (0.0462)***
GroupAffiliation -0.5519 (0.0354)*** -0.3769 (0.0359)***
CreditGrade A 0.3351 (0.1161)** 0.3360 (0.1214)**
CreditGrade B 0.6083 (0.1062)*** 0.6083 (0.1109)***
CreditGrade C 0.9739 (0.1011)*** 0.9673 (0.1057)***
CreditGrade D 1.1377 (0.1027)*** 1.1267 (0.1073)***
CreditGrade E 1.4815 (0.1069)*** 1.4690 (0.1113)***
CreditGrade HR 1.9451 (0.1078)*** 1.9157 (0.1120)***
CreditGrade NC 2.3334 (0.2338)*** 2.3074 (0.2352)***
DebtToIncomeRatio 0.0289 (0.0126)* 0.0266 (0.0126)*
DelinquenciesLast7Years 0.0031 (0.0012)** 0.0030 (0.0012)**
InquiriesLast6Months 0.0297 (0.0035)*** 0.0299 (0.0035)***
TotalCreditLines 0.0004 (0.0014) 0.0001 (0.0014)
IsBorrowerHomeowner True 0.0641 (0.0394). 0.0674 (0.0398)*
LengthStatusMonths -0.0005 (0.0003)* -0.0005 (0.0003).
AmountBorrowed 0.0000 (0.0000)*** 0.0000 (0.0000)***
Income NotDisplayed -0.1943 (0.1760) -0.1839 (0.1791)
Income NotEmployed 0.0879 (0.4743) 0.0542 (0.4781)
Income $25-49k -0.0248 (0.0719) -0.0270 (0.0726)
Income $50-74k -0.1291 (0.0799). -0.1277 (0.0807).
Income $75-99k -0.2264 (0.0986)* -0.2239 (0.0999)*
Income $100k+ -0.1218 (0.1022) -0.1066 (0.1033)
EmploymentStatus Not available 0.1537 (0.1714) 0.1375 (0.1745)
EmploymentStatus Not employed 0.1973 (0.4187) 0.2207 (0.4226)
EmploymentStatus Part-time -0.0964 (0.1260) -0.0950 (0.1280)
EmploymentStatus Retired -0.0108 (0.1690) -0.0178 (0.1718)
EmploymentStatus Self-employed 0.2558 (0.0803)*** 0.2518 (0.0808)***
Observations 10,217 10,217
ATE GroupAffiliation -0.0787 (0.0774) -0.0519 (0.0517)
ρ 0.2973 0.1836
Notes: Signif. codes: 0 ′***′ 0.001 ′**′ 0.01 ′*′ 0.05 ′.′ 0.1 ′ ′ 1
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These are striking results that challenge the theory derived in the second section and
possibly question the validity of the reputation system that was supposed to create that
virtuous circle of group selectivity and loan performance. Though we are impatient to
disclose the secret by analyzing the heterogeneity in the treatment effect of GroupAffil-
iation, we first turn to some robustness and validity checks of our model. We first test
for the validity of our instruments, then check the definition of our dependent variable
for robustness and finally propose an explanation for the counterintuitive rejection of
Hypothesis 4.
5.4 Validity of the Instruments
Angrist (1991) showed in a Monte Carlo study that if we ignore the fact that the depen-
dent variable is dichotomous and estimate
Yi = Xiβ +Giδ + ui
with instrumental variables (IV), the IV estimate of δ is very close to the estimated aver-
age treatment effects (ATE) calculated in a bivariate probit model. We make use of these
results, as the ATE of GroupAffiliation in Table 6, derived as 1/n
∑
i [Φ(Xiβ + δ)− Φ(Xiβ)],
is very close to the coefficient of GroupAffiliation in the heteroscedasticity corrected 2SLS
in Table 7.
With more instruments than we need to identify the 2SLS system, we can test wether
our instruments are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated with the error term
in the structural equation. We conduct a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions as
described in Wooldridge (2002, p. 122) to test the joint null hypothesis that our model
is correctly specified and that the (two) instruments used are valid. In a 2SLS model,
the test statistic is constructed by regressing the residuals of the structural model on all
the exogenous variables in the system. The test statistic nR2 is then χ2(q) distributed
where n is the number of observations and q the number of extra instruments. With a
p-value of 0.18 in the last row of Table 7, we fail to reject the joint null of correct model
specification and validity of our instruments, and we can thus have some confidence in
the overall set of instruments used.
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Table 7: 2 Stage Least Squares
1st Stage Equation
Estimate Std. Error
RateCap -0.1664 (0.0524)**
FracGroupLoansInState 0.8224 (0.1025)***
Controls YES
R2 0.0748
F27,10189 30.52
2nd Stage Equation
Estimate Std. Error
1st step fitted.values -0.1292 (0.0834)
Controls YES
R2 0.0927
F27,10189 40.05
χ210217,1 0.0520
Although the Angrist (1991) results allow us to accurately estimate the ATE of the
bivariate probit with 2SLS, we admit that it is not clear if the assumptions necessary to
perform the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions are met when both Gi and Yi are
binary. We follow Evans and Schwab (1995) here in that this class of tests is the best
available diagnostic.
5.5 Robustness Check with Alternative Meassures of the De-
pendent Variable
As a final sensitivity test, we ask wether our results are robust to alternative definitions
of the dependent variable. We have reestimated our models allowing for more or less
restrictive thresholds for the latent variable to indicate loan default. We shift from
originally 4+ months late down to three and two months late and also considered only
delinquency as indicator of loan default. The results are shown in Table 8. While the
bivariate probit without instruments confirms the robustness of our estimates, we realize
some problems with the IV model. These difficulties can be addressed to computational
problems of R’s binom2.rho algorithm to converge. The last model in Table 8 did not
converge, while the estimation of the other three models in the lower part of Table 8
Bivariate Probit Models 30
converged in up to 10 iterations and give us confidence in the robustness of the IV
bivariate probit estimates.
Table 8: Definition of the Dependent Variable
Bivariate Probit without instruments
Definition Estimate Std. Error ρ ATE (Std. Error) Avg. Default
2 months late -0.2079 (0.0350)*** 0.1012 -0.0304 (0.0296) 0.1751
3 months late -0.2079 (0.0350)*** 0.1012 -0.0304 (0.0296) 0.1544
4+ months late -0.5519 (0.0355)*** 0.2973 -0.0787 (0.0775) 0.1325
Delinquent -0.1295 (0.0518)** 0.0627 -0.0081 (0.0102) 0.0459
Bivariate Probit with instruments
Definition Estimate Std. Error ρ ATE (Std. Error) Avg. Default
2 months late -0.2451 (0.0338)*** 0.1261 -0.0385 (0.0365) 0.1751
3 months late -0.2986 (0.0348)*** 0.1372 -0.0441 (0.0429) 0.1544
4+ months late -0.3769 (0.0360)*** 0.1836 -0.0519 (0.0517) 0.1325
Delinquent did not converge! 0.0459
Notes: Estimates signify the coefficients of GroupAffiliation for increasing thresholds of
loan default. ρ is the correlation of the error terms and ATE the average treatment effect.
5.6 Heterogeneity in the Group Effect
With confidence in the robustness of our results, we now come to the discussion of our
findings. While we verified Hypothesis 1, that GroupAffiliation has a negative impact on
loan default, we seek to explain the surprising finding that borrowers with worse observed
and unobserved characteristics select into group loans, although we hypothesized that the
group leader’s monetary and reputational incentives should lead to a negative selection
into this contract type (Hypothesis 4 ). To give reasoning to our observations, we first
test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 that signals work for lenders in that they represent
valid information.
In a single-equation probit model of loan default (Table 9, first model), we find that
neither the fraction of the loan amount financed by the group leader (GLCol) nor the
interaction term of an overperforming group rating and the number of billed payments in
the borrower’s group (GroupRatingBinOverperf:NoBilled) have a significant impact on
repayment performance. That is, the group leader’s signals are not useful for lenders.11
11Even when dichotomizing the variables GLCol and GroupRatingBinOverperforming or interacting
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Table 9: Probit of Loan Default for Group Loans only
without GroupGrowth with GroupGrowth
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) -2.3850 (0.1981)*** -2.3870 (0.1986)***
CreditGrade A 0.4765 (0.1833)** 0.4783 (0.1838)**
CreditGrade B 0.6002 (0.1725)*** 0.5934 (0.1730)***
CreditGrade C 0.8524 (0.1655)*** 0.8337 (0.1659)***
CreditGrade D 1.0640 (0.1664)*** 1.0410 (0.1668)***
CreditGrade E 1.4020 (0.1711)*** 1.3690 (0.1717)***
CreditGrade HR 1.8510 (0.1711)*** 1.8000 (0.1718)***
CreditGrade NC 2.1320 (0.2893)*** 2.0600 (0.2902)***
DebtToIncomeRatio 0.0328 (0.0150)* 0.0339 (0.0151)*
DelinquenciesLast7Years 0.0028 (0.0014)* 0.0027 (0.0014).
InquiriesLast6Months 0.0260 (0.0041)*** 0.0262 (0.0041)***
TotalCreditLines -0.0006 (0.0017) -0.0007 (0.0017)
IsBorrowerHomeowner True -0.0004 (0.0495) 0.0048 (0.0496)
LengthStatusMonths -0.0008 (0.0004). -0.0008 (0.0004)*
AmountBorrowed 0.0000 (0.0000)*** 0.0000 (0.0000)***
Income NotDisplayed -0.2568 (0.2705) -0.3011 (0.2721)
Income NotEmployed 3.8110 (48.790) 3.7320 (49.050)
Income $25-49k -0.0206 (0.0921) -0.0255 (0.0921)
Income $50-74k -0.1113 (0.1030) -0.1103 (0.1030)
Income $75-99k -0.1279 (0.1282) -0.1228 (0.1283)
Income $100k+ -0.0288 (0.1364) -0.0239 (0.1366)
EmploymentStatus Not available 0.1661 (0.2673) 0.1676 (0.2690)
EmploymentStatus Not employed -3.4430 (48.790) -3.4060 (49.050)
EmploymentStatus Part-time -0.0537 (0.1683) -0.0522 (0.1685)
EmploymentStatus Retired -0.0348 (0.2191) -0.0270 (0.2184)
EmploymentStatus Self-employed 0.1018 (0.1048) 0.0994 (0.1049)
FundingOption Open For Duration -0.1781 (0.0470)*** -0.2052 (0.0475)***
Endorsements -0.1151 (0.0462)* -0.0775 (0.0471)
BorrowerCity -0.0660 (0.0428) -0.0614 (0.0430)
GroupCol -1.6280 (0.6231)** -1.6240 (0.6324)*
GLCol -0.0634 (0.1505) -0.0695 (0.1506)
StateDiffGL Same -0.2157 (0.0714)** -0.1940 (0.0717)**
GLRewardPercentageOfBase 0.2641 (0.0776)*** 0.1850 (0.0794)*
GroupGrowth NO 0.0036 (0.0007)***
GroupRatingBinOverperf:NoBilled 0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0005 (0.0001)**
GroupRatingBinUnderperf:NoBilled -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)
Observations 6,378 6,378
AIC 4,704.9 4,727.4
Notes: Signif. codes: 0 ′***′ 0.001 ′**′ 0.01 ′*′ 0.05 ′.′ 0.1 ′ ′ 1
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To give a possible explanation for these results, we recall the group leader’s incentive
design. The group leader’s incentives are conflictive as well as his functions. On the
one hand he is supposed to filter applying borrowers for credibility and is rewarded a
payment reward upon successful loan repayment. This is what we referred to as long
term incentives. On the other hand, applying borrowers seek to get their listing funded
with his group and this may induce him to excessively accept their applications and en-
dorse their listings because he is rewarded a match reward for every arranged loan (short
term incentive). The design of this incentive mechanism seems to play a crucial role
in determining the group leader’s actions. A look at the coefficient of the GLReward-
PercentageOfBase12 reveals a significant positive impact of the rewards on loan default.
This hints at a dominant short term effect of the reward design, because group leaders
that choose to be paid for their efforts seem to put more effort in getting their members’
listings funded than in diligent screening.
This provides a potential explanation for the failure of a group leader’s participating
bid and the group rating to signal information and loan quality. We will discuss this
issue in detail below. We first consider the insignificant estimate of the group leader’s
participating bid that is even more surprising, given that group members are very well
able to discriminate between defaulting and non defaulting loans (see GroupCol in Table
9), though they have less information about the borrower.13 Then we will turn to the
more complex issue of the group rating system.
As already mentioned in the theory section, group leaders used to start the auction
with their bid at an exorbitant maximum rate to initiate herding behaviour of other
market participants that finally bid them out of the auction. Following this line of
argumentation, the group leader’s participating bid could be a remnant of the group
leader’s first bid strategy. A poor quality loan that didn’t even induce the desired herding
behaviour after the group leader’s first bid will finally – if at all – be financed by the group
leader himself. This seems to be a possible explanation for our rejection of Hypothesis
2, though further research into the auction process will help to shed more light on this
issue.14
them with other variables, we find that they have no significant effect on loan default.
12This is the fraction of the match and payment reward the group leader claims for himself.
13One could object that new borrowers are primarily recruited by other groupmembers, which may
be better informed about the borrower’s characteristics. We would however argue, that the recruiting
process is primarily driven by the group leader, because there is no financial incentive for a group member
to recruit new borrowers and these incentives turn out to be important when we look at the recruiting
process of groups – in the form of the number of loans funded – before the reward system was discontinued
on September 12th, 2007 and thereafter (Table 1).
14We do not go into details regarding a possible collusion of borrower and group leader though these
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Interestingly, the group rating turns out to be a very good predictor of loan default if
and only if we control for GroupGrowth (confer Table 9, second model). Figure 2 further
shows at the example of the largest group, that groups are growing fast as long as they
are rated overperforming.15 We also see in Table 9 that loans with high GroupGrowth
are performing poor. If we put this together, then an overperforming rating per se leads
to a lower loan default. But this effect is counteracted by the opposed effect that an
overperforming rating induces a group leader to grow his group – probably induced by the
short term reward structure – and GroupGrowth is associated with a higher probability
of loan default – maybe because the group leader has a maximal capacity of diligent
screening and monitoring. This argumentation leads to a justified rejection of Hypothesis
3. An overperforming rating does not reduce the probability of a loan to default, because
of a non-functioning reputation system that is driven by short term incentives.
Table 10: Correlation Matrix of Group Characteristics
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GLRewardPercentage 0.05
GroupGrowth 0.08 0.2
GroupRatingOverperf:NoBilled -0.03 0.05 0.63
GroupRatingUnderperf:NoBilled -0.03 0 -0.08 -0.15
GroupRatingBinNone 0.03 -0.04 -0.34 -0.35 -0.16
StateDiffGLSame -0.05 -0.06 -0.13 -0.08 -0.07 0.16
GroupCol -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0 0.03
GLCol 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 0.23 0.05 0.07
conventions can not be ruled out. It may for example be interesting to look at the bid number of the
group leader’s bid to deduce particular strategies and patterns.
15See also the positive correlation of 0.63 between GroupGrowth and the interaction term GroupRat-
ingBinOverperforming:NoBilled in the correlation matrix (Table 10).
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The rejection of Hypotheses 2 and 3 leads to one possible explanation for the positive
self-selection into group loans. The dominant short-term incentives induce group leaders
to select borrowers without diligent screening and we may therefore find a positive self
selection into groups. However, the same reasoning holds if we assume that group leaders
just have a limited capacity of diligent monitoring. We give another explanation for the
positive selection effect, when we address the selection into sample in the methodological
shortcomings.
5.7 Methodological Shortcomings
There are three obvious methodological shortcomings that we wish to address before we
conclude.
First, we did not test the probit of loan default for group loans in Table 9 for se-
lectivity bias. Though we explicitly focussed on the effect of GroupAffiliation in this
paper, it is reasonable to assume that other variables of the borrower’s contract choice
are also endogenous and therefore biased our estimates. For example it is very likely that
borrowers with worse observed and unobserved characteristics select into paid groups.
Fast growing groups may be more likely to select worse borrowers because group leaders
can not invest much time into diligent screening of their borrowers. To control for this
selectivity would require at least one instrumental variable for every possibly endogenous
covariate. Otherwise the test for endogeneity crucially hinges on the assumptions that
all other variables are exogenous.
Second, a severe problem of our analysis, also concerning selectivity bias, is the selec-
tion into sample. While we control for the borrower’s selection into treatment, we did not
address the previous source of possible selectivity bias. To make this point clear, imagine
lenders have particular assumptions about the role of groups in reducing default risk.
These assumptions may be driven by the recent (publicity) success of group lending pro-
grams by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh or the marketplace’s public announcements
that “successful groups have a lower default rate”. These assumptions may lead lenders
to bid on group listings they would not bid on if it were individual listings. Or assume
group leaders, whose job it is to support borrowers to get their listing funded, just help
borrowers to write more attractive and sophisticated listings. Both arguments follows a
selection of group borrowers with worse observable and unobservable characteristics into
the sample. Ignoring this bias and treating the selection process into the sample as a
purely random phenomenon (as we did) would systematically bias the effect of group
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affiliation on loan default upwards. This will have distinct consequences for the validity
of our estimates. However we argue, not for the validity of the rejection of our Hypothesis
1. Instead, our (negative) estimate of the group affiliation effect on loan default can be
interpreted as a lower bound estimate. Factoring in the possible positive selection into
sample will only correct the group affiliation dummy further downwards.
A more appropriate solution to this problem would be to estimate a trivariate probit
model of the following form, using numerical integration or simulation techniques.
G∗i = Z1iγ1 + v1i (6)
S∗i = Z2iγ2 +Giγ3 + v2i (7)
Y ∗i = Xiβ +Giδ + Siη + ui, (8)
where Equations (6) and (8) are the well known bivariate probit equations and the addi-
tional dummy regressor Si in the structural equation indicates if listing i got funded and
is therefore observed in the sample. S∗i is the corresponding latent variable and Si is the
dycotomous variable, indicating the selection into the sample and following the rule{
Si = 1 if S
∗
i > 0
Si = 0 if S
∗
i ≤ 0,
that is a loan is funded if there is a sufficient number of lenders for which the expected net
benefits of financing this loan is positive. The lenders’ decision to fund a loan is modelled
in Equation (7) as dependent on controls Z2i and group affiliation Gi. The error terms
are assumed to be independently and identical distributed as trivariate normal: v1iv2i
ui
 ∼ i.i.d.N

 00
0
 ,
 1 ρ12 ρ13ρ21 1 ρ23
ρ31 ρ32 1

 .
This model can be evaluated referring to the GHK simulated maximum likelihood
estimator, which is available in the statistical program package STATA (mvprobit, see
Cappellari and Jenkins 2003) or approximated using a Heckman two-stage procedure
described in Arendt and Holm (2006). The validity of our estimates crucially hinges on
the assumption that ρ2· = ρ·2 = 0.
Third and finally, we did not consider a problem that follows the same reasoning as
the one discussed above, but requires a different statistical solution. Assume that lenders
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may be willing to charge a lower interest rate for group borrowers than for individual
listings. If that was the case, our estimates of the GroupAffiliation effect on loan default
would be too optimistic. A more appropriate model for this case would be a simple
Heckman two-stage model with a probit selection and an OLS outcome equation on a
loan’s realized return on investment.
6 Conclusion
This paper makes important contributions to the literature on financial intermediation in
online markets. We examine the role of reputation based intermediaries in online peer to
peer lending platforms. We show that the group lending concept employed by the online
market has certain similarities with group lending programs based on joint liability in
the developing world. In our analysis, we abstract from these attributes and solely focus
on the function of groups as intermediaries, first discussed in Prescott (1997).
In line with the theory of financial intermediation, we find that these intermediaries
significantly reduce credit risk in the form of loan default on the platform. This effect
is however counteracted by a positive selection of borrowers into group contracts. That
is, borrowers with worse observable and unobservable characteristics select into group
rather than individual loans. We provide evidence that this is due to a missleading group
reputation system that is driven by a short term incentive design, which was introduced
by the platform to expand the market and has been discontinued in September 2007. We
show that these short term incentives induced group leaders to set wrong signals that
lead in turn to an adverse selection problem in the market for group loans.
We argue, that the group system could have provided a substantial contribution to
mitigate prevalent informational asymmetries in the market. However, the match reward
that succeeded in growing the market, counteracted the incentives for sustainable group
growth at the expense of less diligent screening and monitoring, and higher default rates.
The discontinuation of the group leader rewards in September 2007 effectively choked off
the group system and thereby leaves a promising way to control credit risk in the market
untapped. Since September 2007, only 33 active groups have been founded – compared
to 707 in the same time period before. Not surprisingly, the fraction of groups that no
longer accepts new borrowers makes up 39 percent of the groups that ever had a loan
and the fraction of grouploans is negligible (see Figure 1). As it stands, the group system
is no longer of use for the market and for economists, using the platform as an excellent
petri dish to test their models.
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Appendix: The Lending Mechanism of Prosper.com
The electronic marketplace is an online auction website where individuals can buy loans
and request to borrow money. Borrowers set the maximum interest rate they wish to
pay, lenders, bid on specific loans by committing a portion of the principal and setting
the minimum interest rate they wish to receive on a particular loan. The online market
manages the reverse dutch auction, assembling bids with the lowest interest rates in order
to fund the loan.
The company verifies selected borrowers’ identity and personal data before funding
loans and manages loan repayment. All loans are made by WebBank, a Utah-chartered
Industrial Bank and sold to winning bidders registered as lenders. Their unsecured loans
are fully amortized over three years, with no pre-payment penalty. The lending site gen-
erates revenue by collecting a one-time fee on funded loans from borrowers, and assessing
an annual loan servicing fee to loan buyers. In case of a late loan, lenders can choose
a collection agency, when the loan is at least one month late. If the collection agency
can’t collect payment from the borrower after four months of delinquency, the loan will
be marked as “charge-off”, and will be eligible for sale to a debt buyer.
A unique feature of the platform is its group system that is supposed to reduce default
rates in overcoming prevalent asymmetries of information on the platform. The group
leader acts as intermediary who is delegated to pre-screen potential borrowers and to
monitor loan repayment. To set incentives for diligent screening and monitoring, group
leaders are rewarded a payment reward upon the borrower’s timely repayment of the
monthly rate due. In October 2006, the platform introduced a group rating system to set
further incentives for group leaders to build up reputation for their group’s past conduct.
